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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tim Carl Mantz appeals from the judgment of conviction entered after a 
jury found him guilty of aggravated assault. Specifically, he claims the district 
court should not have allowed his victim's preliminary hearing testimony to be 
entered into evidence at his jury trial after his victim became unavailable due to 
his death. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Mantz was charged with aggravated assault. (R., pp.22-23.) The 
complaint alleged Mantz fired a handgun near Karl Hoidal's head and verbally 
threatened him. (R., pp.15-18.) Mantz made his initial appearance before a 
magistrate on April 2, 2007, and his preliminary hearing was scheduled for April 
13, 2007. (R., pp.26, 29.) Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, the 
preliminary hearing was continued until June 7, 2007, to allow for full discovery 
and adequate time to prepare. (R., pp.36-38.) By April 17, 2007, the state had 
provided discovery including 138 pages of reports and documentation and 4 
CDs. (R., pp.40-47.) A few additional documents were provided by the state by 
May 15, 2007, including a lab report and a few supplemental reports and 
statements regarding prior incidents involving the defendant, but the bulk of the 
discovery was provided to Mantz by April 17, 2007, almost two months before 
the preliminary hearing. (R., p.161.) 
Karl Hoidal testified at the preliminary hearing as one of the state's 
witnesses, and was subject to direct examination, cross-examination, re-direct 
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examination and re-cross-examination. (P.H. Tr., pp.13-85.) At the close of 
evidence, Mantz was bound over as charged. (R., pp.52, 58-61.) A jury trial was 
scheduled for October 29, 2007. (R., p.69.) 
On September 25, 2007, Karl Hoidal died in an automobile accident. (R., 
p.157.) The state filed a motion in limine asking the district court to admit Karl's 
preliminary hearing testimony at trial. (R., pp.157-171.) Mantz filed a brief in 
opposition to the state's motion in limine (R., pp.184-203), and his own motion in 
limine asking the court to prohibit the admission of the same testimony (R., 
pp.204-206). The district court granted the state's motion in limine, allowing 
Karl's preliminary hearing testimony to be admitted at trial. (R., pp.225, 252-255; 
11/1/07 Tr., p.164, Ls.3-24.) 
At the jury trial, the audio recording of Karl's preliminary hearing testimony 
was played for the jury, and while the jury was permitted to follow along with a 
copy of the transcript, the jury was not permitted to take a copy of the transcript 
back to the jury room. (Trial Tr., p.412, L.22- p.414, L.21.) After the jury found 
Mantz guilty of aggravated assault, the district court entered a judgment of 
conviction and Mantz filed this timely appeal. (R., pp.366, 445-448, 455-457.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Mantz states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Whether the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution prohibits the State from 
introducing into evidence in its case in chief at a criminal trial 
the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness. 
2. Whether Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho Constitution 
prohibits the State from introducing into evidence in its case 
in chief at a criminal trial the preliminary hearing testimony of 
an unavailable witness. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
Has Mantz failed to carry his burden of showing that the district court violated 
Mantz's confrontation rights when it admitted the preliminary hearing testimony 
of Karl Hoidal where Mantz had the opportunity to cross-examine Karl at the 




Mantz Has Failed To Establish The District Court Violated His Confrontation 
Rights When It Admitted The Preliminary Hearing Testimony Of Karl Hoidal 
Introduction 
Mantz claims the district court violated his rights under the Confrontation 
Clause when it admitted Karl Hoidal's preliminary hearing testimony at trial. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-23.) Specifically, Mantz argues that "The Confrontation 
Clause ... prohibits the State from introducing into evidence in its case in chief ... 
the preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness." (Appellant's brief, 
p.6.) Mantz argues that this blanket prohibition is mandated by the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (an 
out of court statement made to law enforcement was testimonial and thus could 
not be admitted at trial the witness was unavailable to testify, and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination). Because the Supreme Court's 
decision in Crawford in fact supports the opposite conclusion, Mantz's claim fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Constitutional issues are questions of law subject to free review by this 
Court." State v. Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91, 90 P.3d 314, 316 (2004). 
C. Crawford Supports The Admission Of Testimony Obtained At A 
Preliminary Hearing 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. 
Washington does not mandate a blanket prohibition against the admission of 
preliminary hearing testimony at a criminal trial. In fact, the opinion itself leads to 
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the opposite conclusion: that a preliminary hearing provides an accused with his 
earliest opportunity to confront the witnesses against him and test their 
statements through the crucible of cross-examination. The admission of 
preliminary hearing testimony by a witness who later becomes unavailable does 
not offend the Confrontation Clause. Mantz's claim otherwise finds no support in 
the very authority he relies on. 
The Court in Crawford was concerned with determining whether the 
admission of an out-of-court statement at Crawford's trial violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, where the statement of 
a witness to law enforcement was admitted pursuant to the trial court's finding 
that the circumstances and content of the statement bore adequate indicia of 
reliability or guarantees of trustworthiness. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42. In 
resolving this question, the Court reflected on several centuries of jurisprudence 
in an effort to make clear the purpose and scope of protection of the 
Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-50. 
Based on its review of these several cases, the Court concluded "history 
supports two inferences about the meaning of the Sixth Amendment": (1) that the 
primary evil at which the Clause is aimed is the government's gathering of ex 
parte evidence with the purpose of using that evidence at a later trial, Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 50, and (2) that "the Framers would not have allowed admission of 
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was 
unavailable to testify and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. 
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To that end, the Court overruled its prior decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980), which had allowed the admission of statements by an 
unavailable witness so long as they bore adequate indicia of reliability or 
guarantees of trustworthiness, and instead held that the Confrontation Clause 
prevents the government from using evidence of out-of-court testimonial 
statements unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had the 
prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59. In doing so, 
the Court explained that the Confrontation Clause provides a procedural, not a 
substantive guarantee. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. "It commands, not that 
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be tested in a particular manner: by 
testing it in the crucible of cross-examination." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. Mantz 
claims that it is this finding that now mandates a blanket prohibition against 
preliminary hearing testimony. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-22.) The Court in 
Crawford would disagree. 
The Court noted that its case law had "been largely consistent" with the 
two principles underlying the Confrontation Clause. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. 
Discussing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), it noted that the 
defendant had, at the first trial, an adequate opportunity to confront the witness, 
and that the constitutional protection is grounded in the "advantage" of "seeing 
the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-
exarnination." Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244. The Crawford Court expressly allowed 
for the probability that preliminary hearing testimony would meet this 
requirement: "Our later cases conform to Mattox's holding that prior trial or 
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preliminary hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an 
adequate opportunity to cross-examine." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57, citing 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). This statement expressly allows for 
the possibility, of not probability, that the circumstances of a preliminary hearing 
would provide a defendant an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness. In Green, the Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause is not 
violated by admitting a declarant's out of court statements, as long as the 
declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-
examination. Green, 399 U.S. at 158. The Court then noted with approval its 
holding in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), where the preliminary hearing 
testimony of a witness was admitted at trial. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57. In that 
case the defendant had had an opportunity for cross-examination and had 
waived it, but the testimony was disallowed because the government had not 
established the witnesses unavailability. Barber, 390 U.S at 722-23. 
That Crawford overruled Ohio v. Roberts can hardly be seen as a 
condemnation of the use of preliminary hearing testimony, as suggested by 
Mantz. In fact, the opposite is true. Even as it overruled Roberts' use of the 
"indicia of reliability" standard, it approved of the resulting admission of 
preliminary hearing testimony: "Even our recent cases, in their outcomes, hew 
closely to the traditional line. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S., at 67-70, 100 S.Ct. 
2531, admitted testimony from a preliminary hearing at which the defendant had 
examined the witness." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (emphasis supplied). 
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In short, nothing in Crawford suggests a retreat from the Court's prior 
allowance of the admission of preliminary hearing testimony. 
D. Mantz's Argument Pursuant To The Idaho Constitution Should Not Be 
Considered By The Court On Appeal 
Mantz asks the Court to find that Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution also prohibits the admission at trial of preliminary hearing testimony 
by a witness who has since become unavailable. (Appellant's brief, pp.23-24.) 
This argument should not be considered the Court on appeal, because Mantz 
has provided no argument or authority in support of his claim, State v. Zichko, 
129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on 
appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking."), 
and because Mantz did not raise these independent grounds before the trial 
court (R., pp.184-202). Generally, failure to raise an issue in the district court, 
therefore denying the trial court the opportunity to rule on the alleged error, 
constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 579, 
808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991). This rule prohibits an appellant from claiming, for 
the first time on appeal, that the Idaho Constitution grants greater rights than the 
federal constitution. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407-08, 825 P.2d 501, 




The state respectfully asks this Court to affirm the judgment of conviction 
entered after a jury found Mantz guilty of aggravated assault. 
DATED this 1st day of May, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1st day of May, 2009, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Thomas W. Whitney 
Whitney & Whitney, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 8417 
Moscow, ID 83843 
RAC/pm 
Rebekah A Cude 
Deputy Attorney General 
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